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This thesis addresses the problem of follow-on
spare part support and how the Navy Electronic Systems
Command (NAVELEX) plans for this support. Current
NAVELEX policies, procedures, and practices which
impact on follow-on spare part support are analyzed and
evaluated. NAVELEX has recently changed its policy
from, in effect, not planning for follow-on support to
an aggressive program to pursue competitive
reprocurement for repair parts whenever possible.
Specific recommendations are made to improve NAVELEX's
policy and planning for follow-on support. These
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This thesis is a follow-on study that relates to
other studies recently completed at the Naval
Postgraduate School and coordinated by Professor Alan W.
McMasters. Two studies motivated the research for this
thesis. The first of these studies, completed by Lt.
Roy A. Hallums, Jr. [1], provided details concerning
the Navy Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC) and Naval
Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX) interface as
related to the reprocurement of 7G cognizance (COG)
electronic repairable items. That study highlighted
problems associated with the transfer of technical data
for spare parts from the Hardware Systems Command (HSC),
NAVELEX, to the procuring activity; in this case the
Inventory Control Point (ICP), SPCC.
A critical element in the acquisition process for 7G
COG material is the requirement for accurate technical
descriptions of the items to be procured. The
responsibility for providing this data lies with
NAVELEX. If this data is inaccurate, incomplete or not
available, SPCC's procurement alternatives are severely
limited. For example, SPCC may be forced to go back to
the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for follow-on
procurements. From the Navy's point of view, this
12

situation is not desirable because the OEM contractor
has no incentive to provide follow-on procurements at
competitive prices.
The second study was conducted by Lt. Daniel R.
Smoak.[2] That study examined the management of multiple
models of electronic equipment at NAVELEX. It also
highlighted the problems encountered by SPCC when
procurement technical data is inaccurate, incomplete or
missing
.
Both of the studies mentioned above provided
specific recommendations and conclusions designed to
improve the information flow between NAVELEX and SPCC
and to improve the availability and quality of spare
part technical data necessary for reprocurement
purposes
.
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
i
The ability of the ICP to effectively provide
follow-on spare and repair part support for systems
procured by the HSC appears to be directly influenced by
decisions made by the project manager (PM) early in the
life cycle of the system being procurred. Therefore, it
is the PM at the HSC who must plan for follow-on spare
and repair part support.
The primary research question of this thesis is;
"How does the PM and the HSC plan for follow-on spare
13

and repair part support?" This question is related to
initial provisioning because initial provisioning
policies can directly impact on follow-on support. For
example, the system acquisition strategy may call for
total life cycle spare and repair part requirements to
be procured as a part of initial provisioning. However,
initial provisioning is usually only a preliminary step
in a series of logistic support decisions to ensure
follow-on support.
C. SCOPS OF THE RESEARCH
As was the case in the studies mentioned above, the
scope of this thesis is limited to one HSC, namely,
NAVELEX. Other studies, including the ones previously
mentioned have adequately documented the problems
experienced by the ICP when inadequate planning for
spare or repair part support is provided by the HSC.
Therefore, it is not the intent of this thesis to
reemphasize these problems. Rather, this thesis will
concentrate on the policies and decisions that are made
at the HSC (NAVELEX) that may result in the problems
that have been identified by Lieutenants Hallums and





Chapter II provides an overview of military system
acquisition concepts with an emphasis on planning for
follow-on support. Current Department of Defense (DoD)
initiatives will be identified and summarized. Chapter
III will then present a detailed examination of DoD
acquisition management techniques and studies which
specifically relate to the problem of follow-on repair
and spare part support, hereafter referred to as spare
part support. Chapter IV will summarize specific
NAVELEX policies and procedures that relate to planning
and defining strategies for follow-on support. Chapter
V will analyze these NAVELEX policies, and examine their
impact and effectiveness on follow-on support.
Potential problem areas will be identified. Chapter VI
will conclude with specific recommendations.
15

II, SYSTEMS ACQUISITION CONCEPTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter will be to provide an
overview of concepts dealing with the system
acquisition process within the Department of Defense
(DoD). Specific detailed DoD policy and procedures for
major systems acquisitions can be found in DoD
Directive 5000. 1[3] and DoD Instruction 5000. 2[4].
These instructions provide the backbone of all' defense
related weapon systems acquisition concepts and
techniques. This chapter will address major concepts
such as life cycle cost (LCC) and integrated logistic
support (ILS) that guide the progress and planning of
systems acquisitions within DoD.
Emphasis will be placed on where follow-on spare
parts support fits in with these concepts.
Characteristics of well-planned follow-on spare parts
support will also be discussed. Finally this chapter
will review current DoD and Navy concerns about
planning for follow-on spare part support.
B. LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC)
Life cycle cost (LCC) includes all costs associated
with the entire life cycle of a system. These costs
include research and development (R&D) costs,
production and construction costs, operation and
16

maintenance costs and system retirement and phase-out
costs. Spare/repair part follow-on support is a subset
of operations and maintenance costs which also include
costs of sustaining operations, test and support
equipment maintenance, personnel and maintenance
support, transportation and handling, facilities,
modifications and technical data changes. [5]
Because of the paucity of funds to support all
aspects of each DoD project, "the challenge to the
program manager is to reduce system lifetime costs,
achieve an acceptable military performance, and meet
operational capability schedules—all simultaneously."
[6:3-50]
C. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT (ILS)
ILS has been defined as "a management function that
provides the initial planning, funding, and controls
which help to assure that the ultimate consumer (or
user) will receive a system that will not only meet
performance requirements, but one that can be
expeditiously and economically supported throughout its
programmed life cycle . " [ 5 : 13 ] The key word and phrase
in this definition are "planning" and "economically
supported". Planning implies that ILS considerations
should be a part of the earliest stages of a project's
life cycle. The phrase "economically supported
17

throughout its programmed life cycle" indicates that
ILS has economic impacts in all stages of the life
cycle of a system.
D. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Configuration management includes "the necessary
management functions required to ensure that
compatibility is maintained between all elements of a
system whenever any single given element is changed for
any reason ."[ 5 : 276 ] A worthwhile objective of
configuration management is to standardize, as much as
possible, the internal components of similar systems.
If the true configuration of a system is not specified
or similar systems have different configurations,
follow-on spare part support could be severly hampered
because incorrect parts or incorrect numbers of parts
may be procurred for backup or no parts may be
available for follow-on support depending on the extent
of the loss of configuration management control.
E. ATTRIBUTES OF WELL-PLANNED FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT
Management of life cycle costs, planning for ILS
and intense configuration management are the foundation
of good follow-on spare part support. If one of these
elements is missing or otherwise ineffective, follow-on
support is likely to be non-existent or ineffective at
best. With each of these elements, plans should be
18

made to minimize the risks of not having the correct
spare part when required. The challenge is to
anticipate the potential sources of these risks at the
beginning of the life cycle. Many times it is counter
productive to system supportability to try to fix, or
"band-aid" the follow-on support after problems occur
or are discovered. This type of reaction often leads
to exorbitantly priced parts. Examples of this type
will be discussed below.
An important attribute of effective follow-on spare
part support is the ability of the ICP to continually
procure the required parts for system support. A
significant amount of planning must be done to ensure
that the weapon system's parts can be easily reprocured
for follow-on support. The PM must consider the level
of detail or specifications required that will
facilitate the ICP's procurement of the parts. In
addition, the PM must ensure these specifications are
provided to the ICP.
Another attribute of good follow-on spare part
support is that a plan has been developed to offset any
degradation to supportability brought on by
obsolescence. This is of real concern, especially for
electronic spare/repair parts. Changing technology is
always a factor in electronic equipment. What is new
19

today may be old tomorrow. It is often difficult to
have a plan in mind to compensate for obsolescence.
Nevertheless, obsolescence should be considered and
alternatives should be developed and evaluated,




How the military services procure spare parts and
the amount of money that is being paid to contractors
for these parts is of general public concern. Because
the Reagan Administration has increased the defense
budget while holding the line on other governmental
agencies and programs, defense outlays are being looked
at very closely. It is even more imperative that DoD
resolves the problems and/or situations which result in
exorbitant prices for spare parts.
In a recent Congressional hearing about DoD
procurement practices for spare parts, a Congressman,
who was concerned and frustrated with the exhorbitant
prices DoD components were paying to contractors for
follow-on spare parts made the following comment to a
DoD official, "Your record of moving from sole source
to competition is horrible. The American public is fed
up... they want somebody to do something about it. The
proof of the pudding is the eating thereof... I assure
20

you that we are going to be looking over your
shoulder ."[ 7 : 2 ] The language is direct and to the
point. The Congress, DoD and the Navy have recognized
severe problems brought about by some of the methods
negotiated between DoD and government contractors to
procure spare parts. Classic examples that highlight
these problems are the four-cent diode that cost the
Navy $110 or the sixty-seven cent bolt that was price
at $17.59, or even the $15 claw hammer that was marked
up to $435. [8] The Secretary of Defense has recently
outlined a ten-point program to fight price abuse.
[ See Appendix A ] .
DoD has researched the problems and situations
which result in exorbitant prices and the majority of
findings result in similar conclusions and
recommendations. Simply put, the military services
must ensure competition is an active player in spare
part procurement. To this end, the Navy has
implemented Project BOSS (Buy Our Spares Smart).
"Project BOSS is an effort to monitor and coordinate
actions that address specific problems and systemic
weaknesses in the material acquisition process. The
focus on the broad issue of acquisition instead of the
narrower topic of procurement is essential to highlight
21

the fact that the procurement process is tied
extensively to other functional disciplines ."[ 7 : 2
]
The approach BOSS is taking is likely to have a
significant impact on the way PMs do business in the
future. Currently, there are over 100 BOSS initiatives
in progress. The Navy has recognized the importance of
this program and has reallocated funds in excess of $35
million to add 550 civilian positions and over 200 man-
years of contractor effort to support the program. [7]
While the author was doing research for this thesis, it
was evident that BOSS initiatives were beginning to
have an effect on the way PMs at NAVELEX were doing
business, albeit the full effect of the BOSS program or
even the its name was not known or understood by PMs
that were interviewed.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to set the stage for the
research and analysis that is to follow throughout the
rest of this thesis. It began by identifying system
acquisition concepts that are necessary to understand
before research conclusions can be evaluated. These
concepts look at system acquisition from a strategic
overview perspective.
Finally, this chapter has emphasized that the
concern for spare part support is a topical issue which
22

has many people actively examining an entire spectrum
of issues. Although this thesis was not born of any of
of these issues per se, it cannot help but be
influenced by them to some degree.
23

III. SUPPORT PERSPECTIVES AND STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to better evaluate how NAVELEX plans for
follow-on spare part support, it may be beneficial to
review the methods by which other DoD components have
dealt with this issue. In particular, it is worthwhile
to define and analyze the alternative methods for
follow-on support. In addition to reviewing support
methods, this chapter will also review the issue of
competitive versus sole source spare part support.
This is by far one of the most influential factors in
current DoD policy decisions. Several recent studies
have examined the issue and have come up with varying
conclusions. These conclusions will be summarized.
B. ACQUISITION METHODS
1. Single Vendor Integrity (SVI)
Single Vendor Integrity (SVI) is a logical and
direct approach to spare part support. Simply stated,
SVI requires that there be only one acceptable source
for each repair part and that each repair part will be
exactly the same for each weapon system produced.
Usually, choice of the vendor for the repair part would
24

be left to the discretion of the primary contractor.
SVI appears to be very appealing to a PM who is
managing a system with, (1) limited application and,
(2) a short life cycle. Probably the SVI concept is
used more often by default than by design. Lack of
forethought or lack of sufficient funding in the early
stages of system acquisition, has resulted in the
unintended or unplanned use of SVI by DoD components.
It may be a "quick and dirty" way in which the PM may
solve his logistics support problems, but clearly it
does not have a cost advantage to a customer that
maintains extensive repair and maintenance facilities
that are strongly reinforced with large quantities of
repair parts.
Moore, in an article on SVI, has highlighted
some advantages and disadvantages from the perspective
of the purchaser of an SVI system. [9] Moore makes the
point that when logistics support costs represent a
significant portion of the total system cost, using SVI
would reduce provisioning costs such as costs
associated with spare parts, training, technical manual
requirements and maintenance. Moore also states that
SVI is generally not compatible with Defense system
acquisition because Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR) require multiple source competitive situations to
25

eliminate, as much as possible, problems associated
with sole source procurements.
SVI has some serious disadvantages, especially
when total life cycle costs are considered. Production
costs are increased by requiring the SVI source to
locate contractors to provide various parts of the
system in a coordinated and timely fashion that is
consistent with the overall milestone plan of the DoD
component. The SVI contractor may take advantage of
the customer by arbitrarily raising costs for spare
parts. Because backup or wholesale inventories are not
held by the SVI customer, there is no protection
against the SVI source ceasing to be interested in
providing support. In addition, the source may refuse
to sell technical information about the spare parts to
the customer. When this happens, the customer is
denied the capability to second- source his spare parts
Finally, SVI severely limits the flexibility of the
customer to consider and implement design changes since
the SVI contractor would have no incentive to make
production changes and could demand large amounts of
money from the customer to implement them.
In spite of these disadvantages, because SVI
has short run appeal and seemingly resolves the
logistics problem for the PM with no "up-front"
26

investment costs, it continues to be a follow-on
support method used by NAVELEX and many other
components of DoD.
2. Phased Provisioning
"Phased provisioning is a management technique
used to defer procurement of selected spare and repair
parts during initial support of weapon systems, support
systems and end items of equipment while still
supporting the operation of the weapon system. M [10]
Phased provisioning has existed within DoD since 1963
with the issuance of DoD Instruction 4140. 19. [11] The
only serious application of this concept was by the Air
Force in the 1960s for the F-lll aircraft. Despite
pressure to use phased provisioning and attempts to do
so, the Navy has had only two applications of phased
provisioning; the A-7A program and the F-14 program.
Neither of these systems remained with the phased




Contractor support of some form or another
usually is preferred by the Navy. "Navy managers
believe that the maintainence of separate records of
phased provisioning items in buffer stock results in
administrative costs that are higher than a comparable




Phased provisioning will be examined here
because this provisioning technique does have some
impact on follow-on spare part support; both positive
and negative.
Through phased provisioning, "Some or all of
the initial procurement of the selected items may be
deferred until the final production run when (1) the
latest in-service experience and test data are
available, thus allowing for better provision
decisions, (2) the design of the system is more stable,
thus lowering the risk of engineering changes that
require retrofit and (3) the service has had time to
develop firm operational and maintenance program and
deployment plans, thus reducing uncertainties
concerning the scope of the project and maintenance
requirements. "[10:1-2]
DoD Instruction 4140.19 indicates that the









-Items with new or unique design or operating
characteristics for which spare requirements cannot be
computed with reasonable assurance of accuracy
-Items with production leadtimes over six
months
-Items not commercially available or
unavailable in the supply system. [11]
Phased provisioning could have a beneficial
impact on system acquisition by lowering total life
cycle costs. It could also have a beneficial impact on
follow-on spare part support by better defining support
requirements. However, because phased provisioning
ends when the production has been completed, it does
not seem to deal with the question of follow-on support
after the production phase. Without additional
planning, the DoD component could find itself locked
into the OEM for follow-on support. This situation is
similar to the SVI concept. The costs avoided during
the phased provisioning could be incurred during the
operations and maintenance phase of the system life
cycle because the OEM has no incentive to hold either
his costs or prices down at that time. The benefits of




3. Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production
(SAIP)
The Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Production (SAIP) concept is to produce and procure
items to serve as spares at the same time as items to
be installed as initial components of weapons systems.
The SAIP concept's major appeal is that it presumes to
lower total life cycle costs by "(1) avoiding redundant
set-up costs by reducing the number of separate
production orders, (2) taking advantage of economies of
scale by increasing the average production lot size per
order, and (3) taking greater advantage of learning."
[12:iii] It also follows that these spares parts are
available earlier, and that it is possible that
enhanced readiness could result.
SAIP can be viewed as the antithesis of phased
provisioning. Where phased provisioning would
emphasized deferring the decision to procure spare
parts as far into the production phase of system
acquisition as possible, SAIP would stress the benefits
that accrue by procuring spare parts early in the
production phase of the system acquisition. However,
there is always the question of obsolescence caused by
technological and engineering changes that could result
and which phased provisioning is supposed to reduce.
Research has been initiated to determine if SAIP spare
30

parts were prone to more engineering changes after
production. Arthur and Fisher[13] set out to determine
the impact of using a SAIP program by using a
Mann-Whitney U test to determine if there was a
significant difference between the number of approved
engineering change proposals processed for SAIP spares
and spares ordered in the conventional manner. The
result of this test was "that the SAIP population of
parts was not significantly less design stable than the
non-SAIP population ."[ 13 : 29
]
Although SAIP appears to be a good way to plan
for follow-on spare part support, it still relies
heavily on the prime contractor. Thus the purchasing
military service component must contend with many of
the same problems identified by SVI and phased
provisioning
.
A comparison of the three procurement





EVALUATION OF PROCUREMENT TECHNIQUES*
Desired Actions Techniques
SVI Phased Provisioning SAIP
1. Defer procurement of
unstable design items Yes Yes No
2. Defer procurement due
to program uncertainity Yes Yes No
3. Lower unit price of
spares Perhaps Perhaps Yes
4. Buy spares in proper
configuration Yes Yes Yes
5. Hedge against
overprocurement Yes Yes No
6. Hedge against
underprocurement Perhaps No No
7. Continued spare part
support after
production Yes No No
An important concept to keep in mind is that
follow-on spare part support extends beyond the
*The majority of this data is extracted from Lengel*s
study titled "Phased Provisioning". (See reference [10])
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production phase of systems acquisition. Therefore, if
phased provisioning or SAIP is used to enhance early
supply support, additional thought must be given to
supply support after the production phase is complete.
C. PLANNING FOR FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT
DoD has developed techniques to enhance cost
effective follow-on support for spare and repair parts.
Three of these techniques are breakout, procurement




Breakout is a process by which parts are
identified that are currently bought sole source from a
prime contractor which could actually be bought
directly from a subcontractor or even competitively
from numerous sources.
Because of the growing complexity of weapon
systems and the limited funds available for system
acquisition project support, DoD has become
increasingly dependent on prime contractor support.
Efforts are currently being made to reverse this
trend and enhance breakout opportunities in the Navy.
However, some prime contractors have been reluctant to




Many times when the Navy attempts to enhance
competition through breakout initiatives, contractors
claim that their technical data are proprietary or that
the data are available only at an extremely high price.
This type of resistance emphasizes the necessity of
requiring breakout as a part of the initial systems
acquisition contract. It is at this time that the
contractor has the most incentive to provide the
required data at the lowest price. Fortunately, not
all breakout efforts after the initial system
acquisition have been unsuccessful. For example, "GE,
the prime contractor for a clearance guage, told SPCC
that it would take 30 days to prepare a quote and 36 to
40 weeks for delivery of the guage. SPCC... was able to
determine that the guage was a 'buy' item for GE and
solicited quotes from two sources. The award was made
to Patriot Toolmakers, Inc., at $1656 each with a
90-day delivery. Based on the last price paid to
GE...(SPCC) saved $8,861.58 and improved delivery time
by 162 days. "[7:4]
2. Procurement Method Coding (PMC)
Procurement method coding (PMC) is the
application of a numeric code which identifies the
optimum method of procurement of an item recommended to
the contracting officer. (See Appendix B) The
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assignment of the code is based on the Government's
ability to obtain competitive bids for making the item
(referred to in acquisition as "competing the item")
currently available as well as actual market
experience. The intent of PMC is to provide a hedge
against restricting the source of supply for spare
parts. PMC can be considered as a subset of the
breakout process.
Early in the provisioning phase of a weapon
systems life cycle, the contractor may be contractually
required to provide a Contractor Recommended Code (CRC)
signifying the recommended method of reprocureraent of
spare parts. Based on this recommendation the DoD
component activity assigns the PMC. Concurrence with
the CRC is not automatic. The DoD component must
consider the downstream ability of the Government to
compete the item. These decisions are often criticial
to effective follow-on support and minimum life cycle
costs. Based on the PMC decision, the DoD component
will then procure the necessary specification, designs,
drawings, processes, etc. necessary for reprocurement
.
PMC can be an effective tool, but it must be
applied conscientiously and with an eye towards the
future. One Air Force study concluded "Currently the
PMC process appears to suffer from a futurity complex
35

which gives insufficient attention to tomorrow's issues
today. The result is more problems tomorrow ."[ 14 : 30
]
3. Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP)
The Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP) is
the cornerstone for insuring that a weapons system can
do what it was designed to do after it is produced. As
the name implies, this management tool coordinates and
plans for logistic support.
The ILSP is divided into several segments. In
particular, a major segment deals with supply support.
In this segment, plans should be defined to facilitate
both initial provisioning and follow on spare part
support. The ILSP, as used by NAVELEX, will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
D. THE QUESTION OF SOLE SOURCE VERSUS COMPETITION
Because the issue of relying on a sole source for
replenishment of spare parts is a topical issue and
because it has had a signficiant impact on NAVELEX
policies, a discussion as to whether or not competition
in the area of follow-on spare part support really does
have a beneficial impact on life cycle costs is in
order
.
Rear Admiral Joseph P. Sansone, Deputy Chief of
the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) for Contracts and
Business Management, was quoted in 1984 as saying, "If
36

we have and own the necessary drawing rights and
technical data, and they're current, we can save an
additional 20-25 percent if we can compete the
procurement ."[ 15 : 19 ] Savings figures like those
expressed by Rear Admiral Sansone are bandied about
almost daily. There is a great deal of research that
supports this conclusion. The results of three recent
studies will be summarized.
Study 1: " Competition in the Acquisition of
Replenishment Spare Parts", by Captain Steve J.
Zamperelli, USAF [16]
This study was undertaken as a result of
another empirical study that indicated that spare parts
prices do not always decrease as a result of
competition'. The objectives of this study were to
provide evidence to support or refute the expectation
of price reductions as a result of competition and to
identify unique characteristics of spare parts that
might influence the degree of the impact of
competition. Four years of procurement history data
for replenishment spare parts was used for the
research. The two major conclusions resulting from
this research were: 1. "The introduction of
competition into the acquisition process generally led
to a reduction in unit price ."[ 16 : 104 ] and 2. "Unit
37

prices increased for items that transitioned from
competitive back to sole source acquisitions."[16:105]
Study 2; "A Comparative Analysis of Sole Source
Versus Competitive Prices in the Acquisition of Weapon
System Replenishment Spare Parts", by Edward J. Brost,
Air Force Institute of Technology [17]
The objective of this study was to determine
the effects of competition on weapons systems
replenishment spare parts. Thirty-six replenishment
spare parts with sufficient procurement history were
used to perform multiple regression analysis and
parametric statistical tests. Price changes were
attributed to inflation, order quantity and
competition. The results of this study were:
"1. The introduction of competition into the
replenishment spare parts acquisition process does not
guarantee lower prices;
2. For many items, competition accounts for a
portion of the price change, but the effect of
competition is just as likely to result in price
increases as price decreases; and
3. Price changes are similar among commodity
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This study presented empirical data for
consideration in making savings forecasts. One of the
questions posed by this study was "Is the rate of
decline in price more rapid under competitive
procurement than under sole source procurement?"
[18:1] Thirty-nine helicopter spare parts were used for
the data in this study. One screening factor for these
items was that they had to have been procured at least
three times in the sole source mode and subsequently
procured at least three times in the competitive mode.
This study confirmed other studies that indicated that
there is a savings from competitive procurement. With
respect to the first competitive procurement after sole
source procurements, "A reasonable percentage savings
estimate is likely to be between 15% and 25% . . . " [ 18 : 9
]
The studies summarized above are typical for
studies that have been done in the area of competitive
reprocurement . The vast majority of research does
support the premise that competition does result in
cost savings. However, as seen by the results in Study
2 above, there is some disagreement. What is missing
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from these studies is an analysis of exogenous factors
relating the spare parts being analyzed;. factors such
as technological vulnerability, complexity and
applicability
.
It is a generally accepted premise throughout
DoD that competition reduces costs associated with
replenishment spare parts. It is in this environment




This chapter has summarized some of the acquisition
techniques and strategies used throughout DoD to
facilitate follow-on support including SVI, phased
provisioning, SAIP, breakout, PMC and ILSP. No one
technique by itself can assure cost efficient and
effective follow-on spare part support. The key to any
assurance in this area is early planning and the
quality of the data. Intertwined with these techniques
is the question of competition, which for the time




IV. NAVELEX POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter NAVELEX policies and procedures, as
they relate to ILS, will be reviewed. This chapter, by
definition, will deal with "how things are supposed to
be." Sections of this chapter will reference
appendicies included at the end of this thesis which
present the details of various supply support aspects
of NAVELEX ILS policies.
B. ILS POLICY
NAVELEX Instruction 4000. 6D, "Integrated Logistic
Support (ILS); policy and responsibilities "[19] is the
governing document regarding ILS policy at NAVELEX. It
is based, in part, on DoD Directive 5000.2 which was
mentioned in Chapter 2. ILS policy and monitoring
responsibilities are vested with NAVELEX 08, the Life
Cycle Engineering and Platform Integration Directorate
because "The most effective and efficient
organizational approach for conducting ILS in NAVELEX
is to separate the development of ILS policy and
monitoring for application of policy from actual
performance of day-to-day ILS"[19:2] This policy does
have its drawbacks, however. Many project managers
feel that their relationship with NAVELEX 08 is merely
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advisorial one and view NAVELEX 08 as a step away from
reality .
Because of this split between the policy makers and
reviewers, and the project managers (PMs) or project
directors (PDs), NAVELEX has required project managers
to include in their organizations acquisition
logisticians (ALs) to serve as an interface with
NAVELEX 08. Some ALs are organized in a staff function
from which several PDs/PMs share a pool of ALs. More
typically, however, the AL is assigned and works
directly for the PM. ALs will be discussed in detail
in the following section.
The project manager is assigned the overall
responsibilty and accountability for ILS planning,
funding and execution. The ILS plan is documented with
an ILSP and an Operational Logistic Support Summary
(OLSS). These documents will also be discussed in a
following section.
Each NAVELEX project has an Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV) sponsor. Currently, NAVELEX
has approximately 670 systems in production phases and
approximately 300 systems in pre-production stages. [20]
The OPNAV sponsors or the Chief of Naval Material (CNM)
has the authority to reduce the PM ' s planned logistic
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support. If this happens, procurement actions continue
with no further review.
As indicated above, NAVELEX 08 monitors the
progress of ILSPs within NAVELEX. To accomplish this
task, NAVELEX has established the position of the
NAVELEX 08 ILS Manager (ILSM). The ILSM has two main
responsibilities:
"a. To the Deputy Commander or Project Manager
to ensure that timely, thorough, and complete logistic
support is provided for acquisitions;
b. To the Deputy Commander for Life Cycle
Engineering and Platform Integration Directorate (ELEX
08), to ensure that acquisition logistics planning and
execution is . in compliance with policy, regulation,
directive, and guidance, and is of the highest
quality". [19:6-1]
In addition to the ILSM interface, formal Logistic
Assessment Reviews (LARs) are scheduled at least 60
days in advance of major decision points, or
milestones, in the acquisition life cycle. LARs are
critical reviews designed to evaluate the sufficiency
of logistic planning and activity. LAR policy will
also be discussed in a following section.
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C. ACQUISITION LOGISTICIAN (AL)
As noted above, acquisition logisticians are
assigned to each project. The AL's prime
responsibility is "to accomplish the
planning/development and execution of logistic support
for a given acquisition throughout its life
cycle. "[ 19:5-1 ] The AL, it would follow, would be the
person who could answer the thesis question, "How does
NAVELEX plan for follow-on spare part support?" In
fact NAVELEX Instruction 4000. 6D states, "The AL
provides the link between the design and downstream
cost drivers, such as. ..spares replenishment ."[ 19 : 5-2
]
However, based on interviews with several ALs at
NAVELEX, this is not always the case. Some ALs even
disagreed that they had any impact on follow-on spare
part support. The reasons for this anomaly are varied,
but two predominate reasons have become obvious; (1)
The AL positions assigned throughout the PM/PD
organizations are of recent design. The people filling
these positions are sometimes both new to the
organization and new to the Navy. In short, some ALs
do not understand the Navy supply system and how they,
as ALs, impact on it[20], (2) There is a general
perception in the project offices that follow-on spare
part support is not as much the responsibility of the
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PM/PDs as it is the ICPs. This attitude and perception
is currently mirrored by the ALs . Nevertheless, ALs
have strong potential and can be invaluable in terms of
effective follow-on spare part support.
D. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANS (ILSPs) AND
OPERATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT SUMMARIES (OLSSs)
As explained in Chapter III, an ILSP is a
management tool that outlines the plan for logistics
support. Most ILSPs cover the entire life cycle of a
system. However, within NAVELEX, the ILSP covers the
conception and formulation phase, the demonstration and
validation phase, the full scale engineering
development phase and only the initial portion *of the
production and deployment phase. During this latter
phase, an Operational Logistic Support Summary (OLSS)
is developed and the ILSP becomes defunct. Figure 4.1
summarizes the major milestones and required ILS
documents as listed in NAVELEX Instruction
4000 . 10A
.
[ 21 : 1-2 ] This instruction provides guidance




NAVELEX SYSTEM ACQUISITION ILS DOCUMENTS
Acquisition
Milestone Phase ILS Document
Concept Formulation General ILSP
Formulation
1 Demonstration and Validation ISLP Ready
For Approval
II Full Scale Engineering Development ILSP Revision




Copies of draft ILSPs and OLSSs are forwarded to
SPCC and the NAVELEX Detachment in Mechanicsburg
,
Pennsylvania (NAVELEX DET MECH) and other distributees
for comment, as appropriate. These comments are then
incorporated into the ILSP or OLSS. The impetus behind
the OLSS is to provide a strongly user-oriented
document that provides summary information and
references .
NAVELEX 08 has prepared a "Checklist for Reviewing
Supply Support Portions of Integrated Logistic Support
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Plans (ILSPs) and Operational Logistic Support
Summaries (OLSSs)
"
[ 22 ] ; a portion of which is included
as Appendix C to this thesis. The checklist identifies
specific topics and questions to be answered for each
paragraph of the supply support sections. The
checklist is a detailed and comprehensive management
tool. However, as will be seen, it is not strictly
adhered to when ILSPs and OLSSs are prepared.
E. LOGISTIC ASSESSMENT REVIEW (LAR)
As indicated in Section B of this Chapter, Logistic
Assessment Reviews (LARs) are critical reviews designed
to evaluate the sufficiency of the logistic plan.
NAVELEX Instruction 4000.13[23] establishes the
policies, procedures and requirement for LARs. LARs
are to be held (1) in advance of each key milestone of
Figure 4-1, (2) at the request of the acquisition code,
NAVELEX 08, or from higher authority and (3) at least
once every 13 months. The LAR audit team is composed
of NAVELEX 08 Logistic Element Managers (LEMs)*,
System Effectiveness Engineers (SEEs) and other
personnel as appropriate. The audit team members use
*A LEM is an individual responsible for the
management of a specific logistic support element,
e.g., Contract Engineering, Technical Services, Level





checklists that are prepared for each of the first
three milestones of the acquisition cycle. The
checklist section for "Supply Support" for each of the
phases is included as Appendix D of this thesis. The
PM/PD must receive NAVELEX 08 certification as a result
of the LAR before proceeding with the next phase of the
system acquisition or milestone reviews by higher
authority
.
F. COMPETITIVE SPARE PARTS ACQUISITION
Recently, NAVELEX has taken agressive action to
influence follow-on spare part support for 7G COG
material. Often attempts by the SPCC to procure
follow-on spare part support on a competitive basis
prove futile because SPCC lacks the technical
specifications to assist in this process. Therefore,
the Navy is forced to buy spare parts on a sole source
basis at inflated prices. Many times, what is needed
are Level 3 engineering drawings and associated lists.
"Engineering drawings and associated lists prepared to
this level shall provide engineering definition
sufficiently complete to enable a competent
manufacturer to produce and maintain quality control of
an item to the degree that physical and performance
characteristics interchangeable with those of the
original design are obtained without resorting to
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additional product design effort, additional design
data, or recourse to the original design
activity. "[24:2]
In recognition of the ICP's lack of technical
documentation, NAVELEX 08 reviewed 158 hardware
contracts. Only 22 percent of the contracts required
the contractors to deliver Level 3 drawings. As a
result of this finding, NAVELEX 08 set forth new policy
which states:
"Level 3 drawings are required to support
competitive reprocurement of spare parts. Since it is
often more economical to procure this data from the OEM
before the hardware contract is closed out, it is
requested that addressees review their contracts which
do not include Level 3 drawing requirements and
initiate action as appropriate to ensure that technical
data to support competition will be available for spare
parts reprocurement. It is further requested that
addressees ensure drawings are reviewed for technical
accuracy and completeness prior to acceptance. "[25:1]
Although NAVELEX contracts do require contractors
to provide technical data to facilitate spare part
procurements, there are many problems that exist in the
way that this is accomplished. The technical data is
generally sent to the Electronic Systems Department at
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SPCC where it is filed by drawing or part number on
computer cards. "Engineering technical data for
competitive procurements is accepted by SPCC with no
review for technical accuracy... When the requirement
to reprocure a given item occurs, the technical
packages are frequently found to be of insufficient
quality (inaccurate, inadequate, incomplete), forcing
the Government into sole source acquisition or reverse
engineering. "[25:4-1]
To alleviate these problems, NAVELEX intends to
establish a technical data repository, separate from
SPCC, designed for the express purpose of maintaining
technical documentation for SPCC's reprocurement
requirements. In addition, PMs/PDs will be required to
review the technical drawings for accuracy and adequacy
before they are filed by the resposi tory
.
[ 26 ] Based on
urgings from NAVSUP, NAVELEX also intends to extend




This chapter has summarized NAVELEX's formal
policies as they relate to ILS , specifically ILSPs,
OLSSs, the LAR, ALs and competitive acquisition. It is
evident that much has been written that relates to
follow-on support, and in particular to spare part
follow-on support. It appears that NAVELEX has a sound
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basis from which to plan for follow-on spare part
support. The primary concern in the next chapter will
be how NAVELEX employs these policies and procedures to
plan for follow-on spare part support.
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V. ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF NAVELEX POLICIES, PROCEDURES
AND PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the NAVELEX policies and
procedures and practices presented in Chapter IV will
be analyzed. Questions such as, "Are these policies
adequate?" and "How can they be improved?," will be
raised and answered. In addition, variances from these
policies and procedures will be discussed.
B. REVIEW OF SAMPLE ILSPs
As indicated in Chapter IV, NAVELEX has directed
that its PMs prepare ILSPs and/or OLSSs depending on
the acquisition life cycle phase of the project.
Specific guidance for the preparation of these
documents is included as Appendix C of this thesis.
According to NAVELEX Instruction A000.10A, "The ILSP is
a dynamic planning document written to identify ILS
tasks required for acquisition, and how and when such
tasks will be accomplished. The ILSP contains the
basis for specific actions by Navy activities and for
developing ILS requirements placed in contractual
documents.... The ILSP provides the foundation for
coordinated action on the part of the AL, Integrated
Logistic Support Manager (ILSM), Logistic Element
Managers (LEMs) and the contractor and shows the manner
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in which each of the applicable elements of logistic
support is to be obtained, integrated with other
elements and sustained throughout the system's life
cycle. "[21:5-5]
The ILSP is meant to be a comprehensive document
which should have significant impact of the life cycle
of the project. The NAVELEX Desk Guide Checklist for
the Supply Support Portions of the ILSP and OLSS
(Appendix C) also underlines this significance.
However, NAVELEX ILSPs currently in effect provide only
token concern for supply support matters and even less
concern for follow-on spare part support.
Five NAVELEX ILSPs were reviewed for various sytems
currently in development including the AN/URD-10(V)
Direction Finder Set[27], the AN/SLQ-17A( V)2
Counter-measure Set[28], the AN/UYQ-34(V) Processor
Display Systera[29], the AN/WSC-6(V) Satellite
Communications Set[30] and the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System[31]. All five of these
ILSPs contained sections on Supply Support ranging from
two to eight pages. Four of these ILSPs did not
address follow-on support. The one that did
optimistically stated: "Plans will be developed, not
later than two years before production shutdown of the
main contractor, for the post-production support of the
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system for the remainder of its operational
life. "[31:75]
Without exception, these ILSPs stated that repair
part support is the responsibility of the ICP (SPCC)
without acknowledging the impact that the ILSP and the
PM/PD has on the SPCC's ability to provide follow-on
supply support. Questions such as (l)"Does the plan
state whether the contractor will be required to supply
any/all spare parts as necessary, repair
components/modules as necessary, or supply only unique
non-standard items while standard items are drawn from
the supply system?"[ 22 : 1-6 ] , (2)"Has phased
provisioning been considered? "[ 22 : 1-7 ] , and (3)"Have
arrangements been made for reprocureraent drawings
(DoD-D-1000, Level 3) to be provided to the Program
Supply Inventory Control Point (PSICP) when it is
considered cost effective to breakout the support items
for competitive procurement?" [ 22 : 1-8 ] , are not
addressed in the ILSPs although they appear in the
NAVELEX Checklist for the Supply Support Portion.
NAVELEX needs to emphasize the necessity for
adequate provisions for follow-on support when
reviewing ILSPs at Logistic Acquisition Reviews (LARs).
LARs provide the best point in NAVELEX systems
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development to enforce the policies and procedures
outlined in applicable NAVELEX instructions.
C. EDUCATION OF THE ACQUISITION LOGISTICIAN
The role of the acquisition logistician (AL) was
defined in Chapter IV, i.e., the logistic engineering
and support interface for each NAVELEX project. Also,
it was pointed out that ALs do not understand the Navy
supply system. In addition, some ALs themselves are
not aware how the PM/PD impacts on the ICP's ability to
provide follow-on spare part support. [33] Some ALs see
the follow-on support issue as SPCC's problem,
indicating that the fault is SPCC's for not being in
touch with the project manager. [34]
The AL position is an extremely important addition
to NAVELEX's PM/PD organization and it is a significant
step in the right direction to ensure the logistical
success of NAVELEX projects. However, personnel in an
AL billets must be provided with a strong foundation
and understanding of the Navy supply system.
Currently NAVELEX provides ALs with a short, but
intensive, training course. However, more logistics
engineering training could substantially improve the
ALs' performance. Prior experience with logistics
issues in the systems acquisition process would also
significantly enhance the capabilities of NAVELEX ALs.
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D. EVALUATION OF RECENT POLICY EMPHASIS
The recent NAVELEX policy concerning competitive
spare parts acquisition, i.e, the requirement for Level
3 drawings, creates a potentially costly additional
expense, especially for those projects currently under
contract. For NAVELEX projects in the production
stage, contractors have little or no incentive to offer
their drawings at a competitive price. As was
discussed in Chapter IV, the best time to go after data
such as Level 3 drawings is before a prime contractor
has been selected. At this early time, contractors
would have an incentive to hold their prices down.
The PMs/PDs would like to comply with this new
policy. However, they, may not be able to afford the
additional expense. As the PM/PD considers trade-offs,
the Level 3 drawing requirement will be one of the
trade-offs. The recent policy requiring Level 3
drawings does not address the question of funds to
support this policy.
There are other impediments to the Level 3 drawing
requirement. Some contractors already faced with a
contractual requirement informally have made it known
that what they will provide may not be all that
DoD-D-lOOOB requires
.[ 34] Another impediment to this
policy is that NAVELEX has no historic cost data with
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which to ascertain what a reasonable price for Level 3
drawings might be. [35] Finally, the question of what
types of items should have Level 3 drawings is vague.
The new policy leaves the determination of what Level 3
drawings should be purchased to the PM/PD. However, if
the PM/PD doesn't procure the drawings, the policy
states further that, "the rational for this decision is
requested. "[25:1]
Decisions such as those required of the PM/PD by
this new policy, especially in the early stages of a
project's life cycle, are extremely difficult. The
NAVELEX policy encourages the procurement of Level 3
drawings if there is any question as to whether they
may ever be required. However, the policy memorandum
goes on to state, "drawings should not be purchased in
those cases where high reliability for a specific
repair part results in very low demand and, therefore,
little or no reprocurement action is expec ted .
"
[ 25 : 2
]
Interestingly, some PMs/PDs are interpreting the policy
to mean procurement of Level 3 drawings for every
non-National Stock Number (NSN) designated repair or
spare part. [36] Such an interpretation could actually
raise life cycle costs.
The new policy also seems to be at odds with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which states:
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"Technical data and computer software is expensive to
prepare in the required form and to maintain and
update. Every effort, therefore, should be made to
avoid placing a requirement upon a contractor to
prepare and deliver data or software unless the need is
postively determined ."[ 37 : 9-502
]
Finally, the new policy does not address the
obsolescence of spare parts and components, a problem
of significance when dealing with state-of-the-art
weapon systems. Currently NAVELEX has no policy that
addresses this problem. [36] Often the problem of
obsolescence is taken care of in the course of natural
events. Suppose some electronic system is expected to
be replaced quickly because of technological advances.
Follow-on spare parts would therefore not be a problem
because total life cycle requirements are bought all at
once. In other cases, by the time NAVELEX and the
contractor have negotiated a contractual agreement for
Level 3 drawings for spare parts, the equipment has
become obsolete. Such was the case with the AN/GSE-39
Electronics Terminal .[ 20
]
Despite the criticism raised with regard to the new
policy of competitive spare parts acquisition, the
policy does represent a determined effort to resolve
problems experienced by the ICP when procuring
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follow-on spare part support. It also provides a
partial answer to the basic question of this thesis,
i.e., "How does NAVELEX plan for follow-on spare part
support?"
NAVELEX should further refine its new policy for
requiring Level 3 drawings by providing specific
guidance to project managers to aid in the
determination of what spare parts require level 3
drawings (e.g., based on anticipated levels of demand).
In addition, NAVELEX should evaluate the effect of the
policy in terms of additional costs for each system
acquisition. Specific funds should be identified to
support the policy. If NAVELEX determines that no
funds are available, NAVELEX may have to suspend its
policy until funds can be obtained via the budgeting
process. Finally, NAVELEX needs to examine the problem
of obsolescence of spare parts and develop plans as a
part of ILSPs which would ensure that follow-on support
would not be adversely affected by obsolescence.
E. ACQUISITION CYCLE BREAKDOWN
The DoD acquisition life cycle can be depicted as a
continous process as indicated in Figure 5-1. [38:4]
This smooth and continuous process reflects the ideal
situation. The acquisition life cycle at NAVELEX,
however, is more accurately depicted in Figure 5-2.
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Sometime during the deployment and operation phase, the
continuity of the acquisition cycle breaks down. There
are several reasons for this break down. Some of them
are discussed below.
1. Program Manager's Incentives
A NAVELEX program manager's incentives are many
and they are complex. However, there appears to be
little or no incentive to minimize life cycle costs
beyond the production phase. The PM/PD feels more
allegiance to his program sponsor, usually OPNAV,
rather than to NAVELEX. As mentioned in Chapter IV,
the sponsor has the authority to reduce plans for
logistic support. It is significant to note that the
sponsor, being a part of a more senior command and
being the controller of the purse strings for NAVELEX
projects, presents an interesting dilemma for the
PM/PD. Because the sponsor is interested in results,
i.e., providing new hardware to the Fleet, this also
becomes the major concern for the PM/PD and the
overriding factor in any cost trade-off the PM/PD must
make. With limited funds and with pressure to get the
project into production, follow-on support suffers in
the wake of hardware trade-off decisions. This
pressure often results in a weapon system entering the
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the case with AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Countermeasures
System. [20]
Because of the PM's/PD's relatively short
association with the total life of the system he is
working on, typically three years out of a lifetime of
ten to fifteen years, he is evaluated on what he can
accomplish during his assignment for the project.
Problems that may to arise in the future as a direct
result of trade-off decisions in the early phases of
the project have no impact on the PM/PD making those
decision. He therefore has no incentive to resolve
them. His incentive is to delay them in favor of
immediate and quantifiable results.
It is also a fair .criticism to note that the
PD/PM has no incentive to save money by aggressive
management of the hardware portion of the contract with
intentions of supplementing or funding logistic support
elements that have not been previously addressed
because of lack of funds. [35] This situation occurs
because cost avoidance does not result in additional
funds available to the PM/PD. The bottom line appears
to be that PMs/PDs have no incentive to manage hardware
costs carefully because there is no hope of
transferring these funds to logistic support elements.
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2. Perceived Differences in PM f s/PD's and
NAVELEX's and SPCC's Responsibilities
As previously indicated, project managers are
seldom one person throughout the entire life cycle of a
system acquisition. As a consequence, long range
planning appears to have almost no benefit to the
current program manager. Some critics of this
situation maintain that many of the problems that are
experienced by the ICP could be alleviated if the
program manager was held responsible and accountable
for the entire life cycle of the system being acquired
or, if this is not feasible, decisions that impact on
follow-on spare part support should not be made by the
program manager. [39]
Other facets of the discontinuity are the real
and perceived differences in responsibilities between
the HSC and the ICP. After production and deployment,
the project manager more or less is likely to feel that
follow-on support is entirely upto the ICP. As
indicated in one of the paragraphs above, some ALs have
this perception and believe it to be correct.
Furthermore, because two distinct commands are
involved, i.e., NAVELEX and SPCC, it is easier for the
PM/PD to give up the logistics support of his project.
When the ICP finds itself in a situation wherein
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significant man hours are expended trying to overcome
obstacles not planned for by the ILSP or acquisition
strategy, this problem is seen by NAVELEX as separate
and not attributable to the HSC.
3. Internal NAVELEX Policy and Guidance
As mentioned in Chapter IV, NAVELEX policy
requires a different ILS documents before and after the
production and initial deployment phase of the system
acquisition. Whereas the ILSP is developed and
maintained through the production phase, only an OLSS
is required after this phase. The requirement of
different documents, in itself, does not necessarily
create the discontinuity in the system acquisition
cycle, but it does .emphasize separate and distinct
phases in the life cycle rather than emphasizing the
continuing relationship between the early life cycle
phases and the operational phase.
NAVELEX should emphasize the overall
responsibility of the PM/PD for the entire life cycle
of NAVELEX projects. In doing so, incentives should be
developed to encourage the PMs/PDs to plan for and
acquire logistic support, in particular support for
follow-on spare parts. NAVELEX should also ensure that
the goals of PMs/PDs include minimum total life cycle
costs. Perhaps a PM/PD should also be evaluated on the
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planning he does for future logistics support.
Finally, NAVELEX should evaluate the effect of the OLSS
on the project's ILSP. Because of the requirement for
an OLSS for the operation and maintenance phase of the
system's life cycle, the PM may not adequately plan for
this life cycle phase in the ILSP.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has analyzed current NAVELEX polices,
procedures and practices as they impact on follow-on
support. In addition, the position of the AL was
analyzed for potential improvements. Finally, the
system acquisition cycle was examined and a basic
discontinuity in the life cycle was identified and the
reasons for it were discussed. The NAVELEX procedures
and practices do have some weaknesses that require
attention. However, from an overall perspective
NAVELEX policies do provide the structure for a strong
foundation for future cost effective spare part
follow-on support. It is evident from the management
attention and supplemental professional publications
such as the NAVELEX Logistics Procedures Manuual[40]
and the NAVELEX Desk Guide-Checklist for Reviewing
Supply Support Portions of ILSPs and OLSSs, that where
no attention had been given to follow-on spare part
support in the past, strong emphasis now exists.
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Follow up at LARs is required to ensure that NAVELEX
policies are followed by PMs/PDs.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I indicated that this thesis sought to
answer the question, "How does NAVELEX and its PMs plan
for follow-on spare part support?" This question came
as a result of previous thesis work which studied the
impact of NAVELEX PM/PD decisions on SPCC. Rather than
continue to identify problems confronting the ICP, this
thesis concentrated on the source; namely, NAVELEX.
To assist in laying the groundwork for this study,
Chapter II reviewed current system acquisition concepts
that are important considerations for the PM/PD during
the systems acquisition cycle. Chapter III summarized
procurement techniques available to the program
manager. It was noted that some of the more current
and popular procurement techniques dealt mainly with
spare part support only through the production phase of
a system's life cycle, but that some of the other
techniques currently being pursued, such as breakout
and procurement method coding, were effective tools for
follow-on spare part support after the production
phase. The question of sole source versus competition
with regard to follow-on spare procurement was
addressed by looking at recent studies in this area.
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In Chapter IV current NAVELEX policies and procedures
for follow-on spare part support were reviewed.
Chapter V evaluated these policies and practices and
offered some improvements.
B. CONCLUSION
Until recently, NAVELEX did not emphasize planning
for follow-on spare part support. As a consequence,
SPCC faced serious problems in trying to provide
follow-on spare part support. Very recently, NAVELEX
has developed policies that specifically require
program managers and project directors to plan for
better follow-on support. One specific step was to
implement contractual action to procure Level 3
drawings to permit competitive reprocurement of
follow-on spare part support. Another important step
that NAVELEX has taken was to require ALs for each
NAVELEX project to enhance logistics support. NAVELEX
has also developed checklists for ILSPs and OLSSs and
has developed and published a Logistics Procedures
Manual to help the PM to plan and acquire logistic
support for his project.
C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recommendation 1
NAVELEX needs to provide adequate funds to
support its new policy for improving follow-on spare
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part support. The new policy requiring Level 3
drawings does not address how a project manager will be
funded if a program is already in the production phase.
The imposition of the new policy on weapon systems
already in the production phase, or even in earlier
stages under contract, places the government in an
unfavorable bargaining position, especially when
historic cost data is not available to compare with a
contractor proposal. In addition, the program manager
may have no expertise in determining what items require
Level 3 drawings, causing a decision to be made to buy
Level 3 drawings by default. NAVELEX should provide
specific guidance to its PMs/PDs so that the PM/PD
knows when he should procure Level 3 drawings.
2. Recommendation 2
Acquisition Logisticians should have a better
understanding both of the Navy supply system and the
impact that PM/PD decisions have on follow-on spare
parts support. This understanding will come only with
time and experience and additional training. This
training and experience could be readily available if
AL billets were filled with Supply Corps officers who
have had graduate education oriented toward the




A great deal more supply support planning than
is evidenced in current NAVELEX ILSPs is needed.
Current NAVELEX guidance in the form of checklists and
instructions is adequate but not utilized. Strong
emphasis on ILSP supply support considerations should
be emphasized at Logistic Acquisition Reviews. In
addition, NAVELEX should develop policy regarding
protection of spare parts from obsolescence to avoid
inadequate follow-on support. The policy should ensure
that plans for obsolescence are addressed in each
project's ILSP.
4. Recommendation 4
The existing discontinuous system acquisition
life cycle creates problems with follow-on spare part
support. Policies and procedures should stress the
continuity of the system acquisition cycle and the
interrelationship of each phase or actions and
decisions made in previous phases of the project.
5. Recommendation 5
Further research should be conducted in the
area of sole source verses competitive procurement of
follow-on spare part support. Recent studies generally
favor competition. However, it seems plausible that in
some cases sole sourcing may be more cost effective;,
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e.g., when a system has limited application and a short
life cycle. Other exogenous factors that indicate
competition is a better alternative in the sense of





TEN POINT PROGRAM TO FIGHT PRICE ABUSE
[Extracted from "The Navy Answer to Spare Parts
Pricing Problems" The Navy Supply Corps Newsletter,
Jan-Feb 1984]
1. Offer incentives to increase competitive bidding
and reward employees who pursue cost savings.
2. Take stern disciplinary action, including
reprimand, demotion and dismissal, against employees
who are negligent in implementing Defense Department
procedures.
3. Alert Defense contractors to the seriousness of the
problem and ask them to take disciplinary action when
necessary and rewad employees when appropriate.
4. Competition Advocates already in place in the
services must challenge orders that are not made
competitively or appear to be excessively priced.
Procurement offices must heed the advice of the
Competition Advocate.
5. DoD will refuse to pay unjustified price increases.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency will work with
contract Administration offices to strengthen spare
parts pricing procedures and assist in negotiations of




basic contract procedures must be
7. Take steps to obtain refunds in instances where
have been overcharged.
we
8. If alternative sources of supply are available, DoD
should cease doing business with those contractors who
are guilty of unjustified and excessive pricing and who
73

refuse to refund any improper overcharges. If such
sources are not available, they must be developed
rapidly. Suspension or debarrment should be





and investigations of spare parts will
10. The many corporations not involved in spare parts
overcharging should not be maligned because of the










Items screened and found to be already
competition
.
Items screened and determined for the
first time to be suitable for competitive
procurement. A replenishment item
will be included in this group only
when the identification of PMC 2 is
supported by the procurement history
of the item. The alternative
identification is PMC 1.
Items screened and found to be procured
directly from the actual manufacturer
or vendor, including a prime
contractor who is the actual
manufacturer
.
Items screened and determined for the
first time to be suitable for direct
purchase from the actual manufacturer
or vendor rather than the original
prime contractor for the end items
which these parts support. A
replenishment item will be included
in this group only when the
identification as PMC 4 is supported
by the procurement history record
of the item. The alternative
identification is PMC 3.
Items screened and determined not
suitable for competitive procurement
or direct purchase and which, therefore,
continue to be procured from a prime












(Extracted from HAVELSX Desk Guide, "Checklist for
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Checklist for Logistic Assessment Reviews
[Extracted from NAVELEX INST 4000.13]
DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION PHASE
SUPPLY SUPPORT
1. Are any other military services involved?
2. When will the FSED contract be awarded?
3. Is contractor support planned for this phase?
4. Is Logistic Support Analysis being utilized for
the program?
5. Is there an ILSP? Does it include supply support
planning?






1. Does the ILSP include supply support planning?
2. Does the current contract contain any provisioning
data items?
3. Is LSA included in the contract requirements?
4. Is another military service involved in this phase
or in the planned production phase?
5. When is the projected production contract award?
6. Have Program Support Data (PSD) sheets been
developed and submitted to ELEX 8123?
7. Is contractor supply support being accomplished
to support the Engineering Development Models?
8. Has the draft production contract been circulated
to the Logistic Element Managers?
9. Are Maintenance Assistance Modules (MAMs)
required? Have they been approved through a Life
Cycle Cost Analysis? Have they been
budgeted for through PSD sheets?
10. Will the EDMs be used as production systems after
TECHEVAL/OPEVAL?
11. Is more than one contractor involved in this
phase?
12. Is the method of support for the follow-on
production contract set in place? (Will interim
support be required, will Installation and
Checkout spares be required, is Early Supply
Support (ESS) being negotiated with SPCC, is
the normal provisioning process being utilized




13. Have SPCC and NAVELEX DET MECH been involved
in any ILSP reviews or ILSMT meetings?
14. If there are other military services involved,
who is the Primary Inventory Control Activity
(PICA)? Who is the Secondary Inventory Control
Activity (SICA)?






1. Do the PSD sheets property identify equipments
scheduled for procurement in the correct fiscal
years?
2. Are the PSD sheets accurate?
3. Is interim support by NAVELEX planned and
budgeted for?
4. Have INCO spares been procured if required?
5. When is the projected Navy Support Date?
6. Has this equipment been through a FSD phase?
7. Are there any intra/interservice requirements?
8. Is contractor supply support being utilized?
How long will it last?
9. Does the ILSP or OLSS include provisioning
planning milestones? i.e., PTD deliery, tech
coding, files loading, Provisional Item Order
(PIO) buy, procurement lead time, delivery of
spares, Preliminary Operational Capability, etc.
10. Does the production contract contain adequate
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD)
requirements?
11. Are Level 3 reprocurement drawings being procured?
If not, why?
12. Is this equipment planned to be supported by the
DoD supply system?
13. Is contractor life cycle supply support planned?
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14. Are follow-on reprocurement contracts planned?
15. If initial contractor supply support is planned,
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